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As the obstacles to a European Nuclear Force (ENF) are nu^e, most recent studies of this problem have concentrated upon the prospects and difficulties -the feasibility-of forming a European Nuclear Force; they have dealt cnly briefly with its value. On the principle that "necessity is the nether of invention," this paper will first examine the necessity or, more exactly, the utility of a European Nuclear Force. Depending upon the degree of its promise and the structure and policies needed to
Ive it utility, we will then focus our examinaticn upon obstacles to its creation and possible ways around them. Finally, we will summarize ways in which it can best, serve the NATO mission, in light of its feasibility.
We start with the assumption that French and British nuclear forces aiv likely to remain independent for the immediate futur«;, limiting the possibilities for a European Nuclear Force. At the same time, we shall Keep in mind the possibility that continuation of the two national independent fc rces may possibly accomplish most, if net all, of the purposes of a Eurof^an Nuclear Force.
We wlix consider five possible forms or degrees of cooperation which are, for the most part, additive (cumulatively more complete and more integrated):
(1) Joint technological development.
(2) Planned sharing of procurement and force allocation. (k) A joint planning mechanism for all purposes except decisions to fire.
We will also keep in mini a limited number of variants in the structural relationships between an ENF, NATO, France, Britain, and the US.
Topmost among these are:
(a) The present situation: A US umbrella, a British force with targeting integrated with NATO's but control under the British, and an independent French strategic force.
(b) The same, except with the French force linked to NATO in the same manner as the British.
(c) The same, but with the French and British also closely collaborating in technology and R&D.
(d) Closely coordinated British and French forces which gradually assume more of the NATO responsibility while the US increasingly decouples its strategic forces from NATO.
When we speak of utility we mean utility in the terms of perceived European interests as well as American, and we mean utility in political as well as military terms. Utility must therefore be Judged by its contribution to the security of Western Europe as a whole, since we believe
•hat collective security is the only hope of actual security of the several states in Western Europe.
In essence, the need for a European Nuclear Force should be assessed by three overlapping criteria: (l) is it necessary to strengthen deterrence and warfighting; (2) is it necessary to help assure cohesion of the alliance, and (3) is it necessary to satisfy European political desires.
But a brief word first as to the factors giving impetus for an ENF will be helpful. These include the decline? in confidence that the 'JE will use its nuclear forces to save Europe when the chips are down; the belief that a dijl. matic military balance between Western Europe and Russia is essential 'o Europe's long-term security and that concerted European nuclear power will help ^"ight this balance; fears that Russia and the US will implicitly a^ree (e.g., via SALT II veapons decisions) not to risk their homelands over Europe; UK belief that her nuclear weapons position will obsolesce and the US may even end its nuclear assistance; and recognition by "Europeans" that a unified Europe, if it is to be a "state," will require the full panoply of the instruments of state power.
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Let us now for the moment skip past the difficult problem of getting from here to a full-blown ENF, and concentrate on the utility and disutility of such a force if created.
Of the possible forms an ENF could take, Joint technological development and planned allocation between the UK and France of R&D, procurement, and force strengths, though involving intricate practical problems, are in reality details which can be achieved by hard work. Our analysis may ultimately show that these forms of collaboration are as far as an ENF should go. These may, in fact, be a valuable c ntribution. But far more important to the requirements of integrated NATO force planning are the additional forms of collaboration: coordinated deployment and patrolling, combined or shared strategic doctrine, and joint authority or agreement as to decisions to use. The following discussion focuses mainly on these latter forms of collaboration, which can contribute directly to deterrence or to warfighting.
By somewhat artificially simplifying the analysis, we can treat utilities under the categories of military-strategic and politicalpsychological. We must keep in mind, howeve^, that either can contribute to or inhibit effectiveness. To the degree that an ENF provides political cement to the defense of Europe or creates worse political problems than it solves, it influences in a major way the military effectiveness of NATO.
The following military analysis is confined to the problem of deterrence and to the problem of controlling the course and form of war should deterrence fail.
UTILITY FOR KiTERRENCE AND WARFIGHTL«
The aspect of deterrence of foremost relevance to an ENF is the problem of credibility. In judging the value of a European Nuclear Force, we must consider not just one, but three problems of credibility: Eiiropean confidence that the US wlül respond in a timely way to a Soviet attack; US confidence that the ENF will complement rather than undermine The third area of credibility concerns West European confidence in an ENF. Once an ENF was created, European doubts about i ts credibility would become a paramount concern. Only by a predetermined t i ming of retaliation , employing some automatic means for ordering th~ response might this credibility problem hypothetically be solved. (For example, th~ automatic linking of ENF weapons launch, to, say the crossing of a crucial phase-line by Warsaw Pact forces.) But sane leaders will never agree to this 'Jnless a means exists to reverse, cancel, or postpone the decis i on; othe~ise this would be a deterrence doctrine even ·more desperate and rigid than is the present French one.
Assuming that ENF has no autcmatic release doctrine, the core problem will be that nuclear states will not be certain to use the ENF for colh:ctive defense purposes, rather than solely for their own na.tional interests. Furthermore, because of the awesomeness ang finality of the dec i sion, they will almost certainly construe "national interests" as i nvoked only by an a.ttack upon their homeland, futile t .10ugh such actual use would then be. To put the credibility problem concretely, Germany will have doubts that ENF will launch its weapons before Warsaw Pac t troops are directly threatening the French border; France will doubt t hat the UK will approve release until France h already overrun.* But this does not mean that there will be no confidence in ENF--only that confidence will be neither full nor unwavering. There will be some confidence in an ENF because strong nations do not usually narrowly construe the j r nat i onal interests. France knows that her security depends on the territorial integrity of West Germany, and the UK knows that her securi~y border is not on the Channel. This kr.owledge provides incentive * The credibility problem ror countries of the NATO flanks will be far greater.
and impetus for both countries in peacetime to base their nuclear response plans on preserving the integrity of the AATO forces and on holding a significant part of Germany.
Moreover, there is at least some chance that when the chips are down, France and the UK would at some point respond.
The contrary view is more widely held. Andrew J. Pierre, echoing a common view, has argued that without a single political authority which speaks for NATO Europe, no European nation "... will be prepared to place it--survival in the hands of another, since the use of the deterrent could invite the destruction of its homeland. The necessary psychological cohesion, political unity and institutional loyalty are lacking. Only a President of Europe with full authority in a nuclear crisis could endow a European deterrent with credibility."* This seems a telling argument. But if it is valid, we are hard put to see why these same countries continue to place the authority to use nuclear weapons formally in the hands of the American President constrained only by the ill-defined authority of NATO committees of national representatives.
The answer does not seem to rest simply on the view, once so widely htld, that the US has a broader, less parochial view of its national interests and is free from the national jealousies of West European states.
Rather, it derives from a very practical consideration. Faced with the impossibility of resolving the dilemma of preserving national sovereignty yet insuring survival, the NATO nations will accept whichever of the various imperfect command arrangements gives the best promise of insuring the coordinated use of all the national nuclear means.
There were additional reasons for placing the main nuclear authority in US hands, to be sarc. The US shield was not only the best; it was the only one available. Moreover, US superiority made actual use so improbable as to permit some tolerance of imperfect arrangements for controlling the decision to use. European doubts about the credibility of an ENF will put a strain on European defense solidarity, encouraging Russia to seek to divide the European states. But this is hardly different from the situation today.
In effect then, there is not likely to be more European confidence that ti.e ENF would respond than there now is that the US will. There would only be more confidence that the ENF would base the decision to respond or not on in evaluation of supreme security interests limited to Western Europe.
So much for the credibility of an ENF to its clients and associates.
Would the ENF improve deterrence in the eyes of Russian leaders?
The most important deterrent values may derive from redundancy, the uncertainty factor, and the "desperate when cornered" syndrome.
The US bases its own strategic posture on redundancy because of uncertainties as to command and control, the vulnerability of each element of its strategic forces, the probabilities of each of its several strategic systems effectively operating, and the advantage in complicating the Russian attack calculus. In effect, we take out triple insurance. Russia to rely upon and exploit the caution of US flexible response. The uncertainty factor would, to be sure, be no more, and possibly less significant than if France continued to maintain an independent nuclear force;
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but to the degree that ENF's greater nuclear capacity would make it seem less a bluff than the force de frappe, Russia would have to take more seriously the possibility of its release.
It is difficult to say whether an ENF is more likely bo act in pure desperation* (or persuade the Russians it would) than are independent British and French forces. Are two more likely to so behave when acting together than one, each steeling the other against self-doubts and irresolution? Probably desperation use is equally unlikely in either case, but the Russians cannot know. More importantly, ENF could do more damage than independent forces, so the Russians would have to weigh the consequences of a desperation attack more carefully.
Even if the redundancy or "desperation" value of an ENF were only as great as for independent national forces, they would be important when added to utilities of a more political character.
Could the utility of ENF be improved by fitting its plans for use carefully into or at least carefully coordinating them with the plans * A desperation attack is here envisaged as one in which the US and Russia decide not to attack each other, so that Russia would be free to retaliate against the ENF.
stemming from US strategic doc t rine? Are there , for example, one or more rungs in the escalation ladd er where an ENF could play a logical role so as t o improve US/NATO c~pab~lities for a controlled nuclear response?
(And if so, would such a role for ENF so weaken its value as a W\:,· of assert i ·1g European nuclear independence as to invalidate it pol5.tically?
This c.uestion is defer:..·ed until discussion of the political utility of the ENF.)
Possibilities within the escalation ladder are demonstrat.: .ms, a t heater nuclear role, and forms of limited s trategic retaliation.
ENF could fire shots at relatively unimportant targets to demonstrate the likelihood of imminent escalation should t he attack continue. But i t would be difficult for the US, ~lch less ENF, to decide to fire demonstration shots. Such shots require early decisions when infonnation as to adversary actions or intent could well be erroneous, and they cross t he "firebreak" threshold early with all its import for the difficulties of insuring future restraint. Should the bluff of these shots be called, then initial NATO resort to conventional ws.rfighting could undermine the further deterrent value of nuclear weapons.* Even should this demonstrative mission seem useful, it would hardly be a sufficient role to jus tify an ENF.
ENF forces could be allocated for theater missions once the phase of battlefield nuclear wart has been entered, either to deter further Soviet escalation by threatening thea.ter war, or actually to be launched in order to prevent defeat at the battlefield level. Commitment of these weapons for t heater-level war merits full discussion. * This coul be obviated, but only by abandoning initial conventional warfight lng in favor of tactical nuclear war from the outset or by using demonstrations after conventional war had started as an interim deterrer,t measure (designed to induce Russia to cease the attack), before escalating to battlefield nuclear war. t Battlefield nuclear war is here used to mean war in which nuclear weapons are used only on military targets which directly affect the engag~ment of f 1·ont-line forces, including immediately available reserves and supplies. These targets lie roug~ly within th~ arP.a of opposing Field Armies.
A theater mission role for ENF forces raises special problems.* The need for theater weapons results from the fact that Russia maintains a sizeable IRBM and MRBM force for which there is virtually no NATO equivalent, the last of such weapons having been withdrawn from Italy, the UK, The ENF could not carry out these functions by use in a counterforce role against IRBMs and MRBMs, both for l~ck of numbers and because of uncertainty that it could strike tt.em before they were launched. The first of these would be an enormous achievement, freeing the US of the obligation to use its strategic force to save NATO. But such a capability is entirely beyond ""he means of the UK and France, even if financially aided by other European NATO countries.
Respecting the second, the US would hardly encourage a force development of uncertain character and utility merely because it was safer than the French force. However, this would be a significant secondary consideration, provided a more compelling reason also favored it.
The third reason has much merit, and may be Just that compelling reason. It would in reality not be a decoupled force, but the Europeans might believe it to be. It would have the merit of strengthening the deterrence of the USSR through uncertainty. It would not bs likely to allow the US to economize on weapons, but it would add reduudancy. As such ENF action would be invoked only after the US (acting through NATO) had employed battlefield, and probably theater-level nuclear weapons, it would in essence constitute no more than reinsurance against US failure to invoke the ultimate option. It would, to be sure, be a more 13 mm* war. An ENF strategic retaliatory threat might offer Russia the possibility of a face-saving halt to escalation without a direct confrontation at the strategic level with the US; indeed, the US might even serve as mediator restraining the 2NF while Russia and the West EUJ. jpean states discuss armistice terms. It is admittedly highly speculative that escalation below the holocaust level could in the event be so nicely kept under control; but, used for purposes of the peacetime public enunciation and practice of deterrence strategy, it could help induce Soviet caution.
The use of ENF in a theater or strategic role would, then, seem to offer its greatest deterrent and escalation-constraining values. But the main justification of such a force would probably be politicul, an area we now address.
POLITICAL VALUE OF AN EW
The essence of the possible political value of an ENF lies in the widespread conviction of West European leaders that a Western Europe without nuclear arms is outclassed in realizable miMtary potential by
Russia, that to correct the balance by full reliance on US nuclear strength places Europe's destiny in good part beyond its control and in uncertain hands, and (really only a corollary of the second) that the US may, consciously or not, sell out the security of Western Europe in order to reach accommodation with Russia on ways to prevent a nuclear exchange between the superpowers. Though this is the essence, it is by no means the whole of the political rationale for an ENF. There are a number of aspects pro and con as to the political utility of an ENF, each of which must somehow be weighed, if a net evaluation of its political utility can be arrived at.
First we must ask whether the soliJarity of NATO threatens so seriously to decline (perhaps even to the poirt of dissolution) as to make the ENF, and perhaps other new measures, essential to arrest this decline.
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Second To see that the solidarity of NATO is today again at a crisis point is far easier than to Judge definitively whether irreversible disintegrative forces are about to take hold. We have only to recall Dulles' European nuclear defense policy lies in an agreement between Fran~e and Great Britain." But he qualified t his, say~l.ng "but it will take time, and Europe must firs~ develop a political collbcience;" Neither he nor the then Prime Minister, Chaban-Delmas, set political ~ntegration as a precondition to negotiations. Pompidou seems .to do so as a precondition for agreement, but if negotiations begin seriously then surely agreement could hardly await the full integration of Western Europe. Rather 1 succe'Bsful. negotiation ( u: acceptable to Get-~) could greatly contribute to, and might even be widely considered essen~ial to politica~ integration. * There are ·also strong factions of French "Europeans" who could be the salvation of Western Europe's difficulties but who have never been ablEi to hold tbe center of French domestic power (exemplified by M • Mendes-Franc~~s failure &t the time of the EDC collapse in 1954).
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Whether an ENF is requisite to or contingent upon political integration is crucial in respect to timing. For if an ENF had to wait upon integration it would be too late tor France and the UK to facP. up to and resolve the technical and economic problems in continuing as modern members of the nuclear club. On balance, it appears that new ~rrangements to strengthen the security ot Western Europe are widely recognized as too urgent to wait upon political unification.
Indeed, technical and economic desiderata could resolve the matter of timing: UK and French aspirations to remain nuclear probably provide ENF its most persuasive political rationale i.nasmuch as decisions related to their collaboration mutt be taken within the next year or two if these countries are to have viable nuclear forces in the 1980's. There was a time when Britain nearly opted out of the club. That time is past, in good part because ot the heavy intellectual and uaterial investment in nuclear know-how, but alao because ot the irrevocable relegation to secondclass status as a pol tical power and technologically modern state which such a decision appears to ~ly. Britain teels no glory in being a nuclear power, to be lure; tor her it is limply a requirement for exerting some influence on lurope' s tuture, a role which could be Britain's last call to renewed greatness. Prance's leadership has never doubted its nuclear aspirations, Which are tied to its saaewbat mystic and vague self-image ot natioD&l grandeur.
France would probably tavor only technical collaboration at present, despite British intere1t in collaborative policy and strategy. Thus, better their force c0mmitments. What of US views? Technical collaboration alone would strengthen ENF nuclear capabilities significantly, but would not be meaningful for US s ecurity policy without the further collaborative steps necessary to an effective deterrent role. At t itudes of US leadership would no doubt remain tentative unt il the form vf these furt her steps began to take shape; but as the US would hope subsequently to influen~e the final f orms of joint collaboration, there is no strong reason why the US would be likely to oppose such collaboration. Indeed, ev~n technical cooperation might permit Britain to exercise some moderating influence on the extreme French position on nuclear strategic policy .
The Soviets would inevitably protest this collaboration as violative of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And their main serious concern would probably be assurance that the agreement confirmed the continued exclusion of Germany from the nuclear club. The greatest political utility or disutility of an ENF would come at ~he fourth stage (a joint planning mechanism for all purposes except decisions to fire). For it is at this stage of UK-French planning that:
a. Arrangements would have to be made which are both acceptable to Germany and tolerable by Russia.
b. The arrangements would be sufficiently sensitive to compel the US to take a position clearly in favor or opposed.
Arrangements unsatisfactory in either respect would spell the doom of an ENF.
It is here, at the joint planning phase, th&t . the utility of ENF a s an instr ument for settling more durably fears of an atomic .ermany would come i nto play. A means to give Germany a voice in determining strategic octrine would be essential to permit the ENF planning structure ~o function. For a dissatisfied Germany could take a number of steps to undermine NATO ~ ENF nuclear plans; moreover, the US would not accept an arrangement not acceptable to Germany. The US might defer its position on the mechanism until it could see how strategic doctr i ne and plans evolved, but on the issue of German acceptability it would no be likely to postpcne forming a policy and acting upon it.
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The US could, of course, bring overwhelming influence to bear to scuttle the organization. keep abreast of the nuclear sysrem developments which will characterize a first-class nuclear strike force in the igÖO's. There are differences in the economic burden of nuclear missile programs each country shares in relation to its total economic capacity, but these are not major.
The greatest barriers to UK-French technical collaboration lie in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the con- It would appear likely, then, in a period of strategic parity when the US has to calculate more cautiously the circumstances for using a strategic 'umbrella to cover Europe, that these obstacles could be overcome, though no doubt only after extensive review and in the face of some opposition in Congress, if the US now found the release of such information desirable either in the interest of an ENF or for other reasons.
IMPLICATIOMS OF A PROSPECTIVE ENF FORCE FOR AMERICAN NATO FORCE PLANNING
Although the prospects for a European Nuclear Force are considered good, there is nc assurance that it will come into being. If it does, it will take time. One cannot realistically expect agreement on the first and second stages (Joint technological development and planned sharing of procurement and force allocation) In less than 12 to 18 months.
Although planning for the next two stages (shared deployment and patrolling, a Joint planning mechanism) might proceed concurrently, it could take as much as three or four years to reach this stage. * Its validity was even then questionable, since US preferential treatment of the British had already been discriminating against both France and Germany.
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Nor can we assume that the ENF pianninp to follow would necessarily adopt US-develcped concepts for its strategic doctrine, although the US has strong leverage to insure this and would certainly use it, given the enormity of the stakes involved.
Therefore, for the immediate future, though possibly only as an interim measure, US strategic planners should consider assigning to a portion of its Fleet Ballistic Missile Force a theater mission designed to offset the Russia-based TRBM-MRBM force targeted on Western Europe.
This need not significantly degrade our Poseidon force in its primary role. Nor in wartime need it cause dangerous misinterpretations on the part of Russia.
As to the first, so long as the force is not to be used in an anti-IRBM(-MRBM) counterforce role, the numbers can he kept to perhaps six to ten of our Ul-bcat force. An interim step might be to assign this mission to the five submarines already allocated to SACEUR.
In order to insure that Russia did not construe a ballistic submarine attack on theater targets as part of an all-out strategic attack, anple measures are at hand. Prior notification, in peacetime or at the onset of war; separate command arrangements for this force; assignment of separate water areas for ohe two portions of the force; and timely use of the "hot line" are among the means available. If such a force is to be used to deter Russian use of its IRBM-MRBM force, then the deterrent communications which would be sent in moments of crisis or at the onset of war would provide full opportunity to make clear that the US intends selective rather than total use of the Fleet Ballistic Missile Force or the entire strategic force. So much for the interim measures.
As ENi-deveJops, the US could facilitate itü assumption of this interim mission (as well as the ENF contingent strategic mission) at various stages. Ideally, technological development and the evaluation of force use doctrine should go hand-in-hand, admittedly not an easy matter since ENF will develop by stages.
Respecting strategic doctrine, the US should stand ready to work close-y though informally with Britain and France. US and Russian weapons and uoctrine will be evolving, and the ENF strategic doctrine should keep abreast of important changes in both.
If ENF is to have roles which complement US missions but which m?y also supplant them, it needs to develop a specially designed missile permitting alternate targeting, variable yield, and different forms of target attack (e.g., airburst, shallow or deep penetration, means to limit unwanted fallout effects). This could require new boat or silo design, although technological advances in fields such as miniaturization may permit fitting the new missile to existing silos or at least existing boats.
In the interiir. phase, the allocation of a US force to a theater mission could raise ruspicions among the Europeans that the US will not actively use its strategic forces to preserve Europe, even though by their very existence they serve that purpose in good part. During this phase it may therefore be necessary to maintain an ambiguous policy on use of the strategic force to preserve NATO, while however urging creation of a European Nuclear Force and allocating US FBMs as means of strengthening the credibility of our total deterrence posture.
As ENF develops and NATO-Europe acquires control over this increasingly imposing European force, the US probably should make clear that it welcomes and favors the planned use of the ENF as a means to help contain any war from becoming a theater-wide or general war, and that it accepts Europe's need to reserve to itself the option of a strategic retaliatory attack on "lussia should we be unable to agree in the event on the timing or utility of its invocation and use.
